In many situations in macroeconomics strategic complementarities arise, and agents face a coordination problem. An important issue, from both a theoretical and a policy perspective, is equilibrium uniqueness. We contribute to this literature by focusing on the macroeconomic aspect of the problem: the number of potential innovators, speculators e.t.c. is large.
Introduction
In many situations in macroeconomics strategic complementarities arise: individual payos from taking a certain action are non-decreasing in the number of agents who adopt the same strategy. Examples include technological spillovers and innovation, currency crises, and others. Cooper (1999) is an excellent recent treatment of complementarities in macroeconomic environments. Also, Lee and Mason (2002) , study the interaction of heterogeneity, uncertainty about economic fundamentals and degree of complementarities. . Jewitt, C. Leaver, H. Polemarchakis and seminar participants at Bristol and Exeter for comments and lengthy discussions on earlier work this paper draws heavily upon. This paper also draws heavily on research under nancial support from the European Commission under contract ERBFMBICT950108, which is acknowledged with thanks. The usual disclaimer applies. 1 In this approach, agents' private types are correlated. This approach, by utilising insights in Schelling (1980) , shows how introducing a small number of dominant strategy types into a coordination game can select a unique Bayesian Nash equilibrium. See also Carlsson and van Damme (1993) . 2 A related work is the investigation in Baliga and Sjostrom (2004) of the implications for equilibrium selection, in an arms race game, of cheap talk when private types are independent.
In an arms race the payog from building up weapons is decreasing in the number of agents who adopt the same strategy, while the payog from not acquiring new weapons is increasing in the number of agents who do not acquire new weapons. 3 A related work is also Mason and Valentinyi (2003) . There, the focus is on the interaction
Given the above work, the common view is that, in order to escape a prediction of indeterminacy of equilibria, one needs to have a suciently large degree of heterogeneity and/or of asymmetric information. However, as we show here, this may not be true in macroeconomic contexts. In particular, this paper complements the received literature by focusing on the 'largeness' of the situations in question. In more detail, our starting point is that in macroeconomic environments the number of potential innovators, speculators, e. In what follows we assume instead, which is how we depart from other studies 4 In a currency crises model high w corresponds to 'bad' fundamentals, and to high devaluation if an attack succeeds. In a new technology adoption model, 'good' fundamentals correspond to high w, and to high quality of invention (or high spillover egects). 5 Superscript o denotes equilibrium variables. 6 While, for w M (3", w N L ] the benchmark game has a unique equilibrium where every player chooses c = 0 of strategic complementarities, that the number of actual players in the coordination game N is a PRV with mean n. We will refer to n as the population or game or group-size. Also, we focus hereafter to fundamentals 5 ( L , H ].
Equilibrium
Introducing population uncertainty implies that players can no longer assign a strategy to other individual players, simply because they are not aware of who they all are. Instead, we describe strategic behaviour in terms of a distributional strategy (see Myerson (2000) ). Such a strategy, n , is de ned as any probability distribution over the action set in a game of size n. That is n (1)+ n (0) = 1 and n (c) 0. Note that n can be interpreted as the 'beliefs' players choose to hold that a randomly sampled player will choose action c in a game of size n.
7 As
Myerson (1998) puts it "...going to a model of population uncertainty requires us specify a probability distribution over actions..., rather than for each individual player. In eect, population uncertainty forces us to treat players symmetrically in our game-theoretic analysis."
When players behave according to , the number of players of any type that choose any action c is a PRV with mean n (c) and hence the expected action pro le in a game of size n is n {n (c)} c5C . To derive expected payos for each action, given n , we make use of two special features of Poisson games. First, that the number of players choosing c is independent of the number of players who choose all other actions (see Myerson (1998) ). 8 Second,
that any player in a Poisson game attaches the same probability that there are d individuals in the game with him with the probability that the external 7 For notational convenience, we supress hereafter the dependence of the strategy on the size of the game n whenever there is no danger of confusion. 8 Without population uncertainty this property could not be satised since the total number of players who choose a certain action must be equal to the known N, see Myerson (1998) pp.9.
game theorist would attach on the event that there are d individuals in the whole game. This 'environmental equivalence' property implies that "from the perspective of any player..., the number of other players (not including himself)
who choose action c is also an independent Poisson random variable with the same mean n (c)", Myerson (1998), pp 16. Accordingly, the expected net gain of the typical agent from choosing c = 1 is
, (1) with f being the Poisson distribution with mean n (1), after following the con-
In essence, then, each player resolves her decision by formulating 'beliefs'
over the likely behaviour of the typical player in the game and then calculating which action maximises her expected utility given the resulting expected action pro le. Following Myerson (2000), we establish an equilibrium if "all the probability of choosing action c comes from types for whom c is an optimal action, when everyone else is expected to behave according to this distributional strategy" (Myerson (2000) , pp.11).
We then have directly that o (1) = 0 is an equilibrium, as B(0, , t) = f (x | n)b(, x + 1) > t. We have shown: Proof. Directly after recalling B(0, , t) = b(, 1) t 0 and de ning the appropriate threshold level n 0 by B(n , , t) = 0. ¥
In the next section we look into some examples that t the above framework.
Examples

Currency Crises
We start with a model of currency crises. In this model potential speculators have a choice between not questioning a currency peg or borrowing one unit of the currency in question and selling it in the market for foreign currencies.
Here, t is the riskless gross interest rate plus any transaction costs faced by the speculators.
Also, b(, x) 0 determines in a reduced form the size of the depreciation of the currency under scrutiny, as a proportion of the exchange rate during the peg, when fundamentals are and the size of the attack is x. In particular, for our purposes here, the bene t function is de ned as follows. no attack will cause its collapse. If instead > L an attack of in nite size will be too much for the central bank to contain and the peg will be abandoned.
In addition, the depreciation is sucient to cover the costs of short-selling the currency. Note that in this model L is also independent of transaction costs t. In this case, for any 5 ( L , H ] we have B(n, , t) = t+()
when fundamentals are in the 'grey' area ( L , H ], survival of the peg is the unique equilibrium outcome if the total probability that an attack is successful, 1 F (x () 2 | n), is lower than or equal to the ratio of (maximum) bene ts from the two actions t/() r. De ning G(y | n)
f (x | n) and m x () 1 we thus have a unique equilibrium selection if G(m | n) r. Not- 9 An alternative model could have that a devaluation always occurs if the attack is very large, but for very good fundamentals the benet cannot compensate for the transaction cost.
That is, limx<" b(w, x) = q(w) > 0 with q 0 (w) > 0 and q(w) $ t for any w $ w L . In such a model, w L may depend on the level of transaction costs, and thereby be sensitive to policies like a Tobin tax.
ing that G(m | n) is strictly increasing with the mean n (see theorem 33.2 in pp.
92 in Schmetterer, 1974) , the latter condition can be re-written as n n (r, m),
where n (r, m) is the solution of r = G(m, n). Note also that n (., .) is strictly increasing with short-selling costs t, as the latter increase the ratio of bene ts r and make the risky action less attractive. The critical group-size n (., .) is also strictly decreasing with , as the latter decreases the ratio of bene ts r (due to 0 > 0) and increases the fragility of the peg (due to x 0 < 0), and thereby makes the risky action more attractive. We clearly have that for any Leaving this example note that here an increase in transaction costs from short-selling, by means, say, of the introduction of a Tobin tax, increases the ratio of bene ts from not attacking and, hence, the critical group-size n (., .), and thereby increases the likelihood that no attack will occur. 
Innovation and Positive Spillovers
We In this case, B(n; , t) = t + ()
So, for any level of quality, survival of the old technology is the unique equilibrium outcome if the mean population-size n is lower than or equal to [t
()]/().
11 The critical upper bound on the game-size for unique equilibrium selection is again strictly increasing with costs t and strictly decreasing with fundamentals , and so we we have that for any 5 R : Leaving this example, we note that subsidies, which reduce the cost of in- Also, to the left of that area (i.e. for suciently 'bad' fundamentals) innovations do not take place, while to the right of that area (i.e. for suciently 'good' fundamentals) everyone innovates. Thus, the prediction is that, unless there is a sudden increase of a sucient size in the quality of fundamentals, improvements in quality will be accompanied by small increases, if any, in the number of adoptions. Here, instead, adoptions are never partial. Speci cally, our model predicts a sudden and abrupt adoption of new technologies by every agent as soon as fundamentals cross a well-de ned threshold (i.e. > H ).
Conclusions
We investigated a coordination game under population uncertainty, and in particular when the number of players in the game is a Poisson random variable.
This game may or may not be characterised by multiplicity of pure strategy equilibria. In fact, beliefs are not independent of fundamentals, a coordination problem does not arise, and unique equilibrium selection is obtained under certain conditions for fundamentals, mean population and transaction cost from innovating, short-selling e.t.c.
A very interesting line of research is to investigate the interaction of population uncertainty with heterogeneity, uncertainty about economic fundamentals
